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Danielle Ireland-Piper*
Prosecutions of Extraterritorial Criminal Conduct and 
the Abuse of Rights Doctrine
Introduction1
Jurisdiction was once primarily understood by reference to geographical borders. However, assertions of 
jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct have become increasingly frequent in the twenty-first century. 
Assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction sit at the crossroads of domestic and international law, and 
can be controversial. This is in part because states may enjoy competing claims to jurisdiction, but 
also because the rights of individuals can be compromised in prosecutions of extraterritorial conduct. 
Part I of this paper briefly explains the distinction between prescriptive, enforcement and adjudicative 
jurisdiction, sets out some of the historical developments of extraterritorial jurisdiction, and introduces 
the principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Part II then identifies some of the ways in which the rights 
of individuals can be undermined by assertions of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. Finally, Part III 
considers whether the abuse of rights doctrine might usefully regulate the relationship between a state’s 
right to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction, and the rights of individuals. 
Part I
In international law, the term ‘jurisdiction’ describes the rights of states to regulate conduct, and the 
limit on those rights. Domestic law prescribes the extent to which states make use of those rights. 
Under customary international law, states exercise jurisdiction on three main bases: nationality, 
territoriality, and universality. Put simply, the nationality principle can provide a state with grounds for 
jurisdiction where a national is either a victim (passive nationality) or a perpetrator (active nationality). 
The territoriality principle may be invoked where conduct either takes place within a nation’s borders 
(subjective territoriality), or the effects of the conduct are felt within the borders (objective territoriality). 
The universality principle is reserved for conduct constituting an international crime, such as piracy, 
genocide and crimes against humanity. International law also recognises a ‘protective principle’, wherein 
a state can assert jurisdiction over foreign conduct that threatens national security. There is also some 
support for an ‘effects principle’, which gives jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct, the effects of 
which are felt by a state. 
* LLB/BIR (1st Hons) (Bond), LL M (Cantab.); PhD (Candidate, UQ), senior teaching fellow, Faculty of Law, Bond University, Australia. Email: 
direland@bond.edu.au. The author is grateful to her research assistant, Gordon C. McBain, for his assistance in finalizing parts of this paper. 
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1. The distinction between prescriptive, enforcement and adjudicative jurisdiction
As a preliminary point, a distinction is often made between prescriptive, enforcement and adjudicative 
jurisdiction.1 Prescriptive extraterritorial jurisdiction refers to the capacity of a state to legislate in respect 
of persons and/or conduct.2 Enforcement jurisdiction refers to the capacity, or otherwise, of that state to 
enforce compliance with those laws.3 Adjudicative jurisdiction refers to the ability of courts to adjudicate 
and resolve disputes.4 This paper is, at various points, concerned with all three. The distinction, however, 
is not necessarily determinative of the issues raised in Parts II and III. Therefore, for the purposes of this 
paper, the difference between the three is not laboured upon. 
2. Historical context
2.1. Pre-twentieth century
Traditionally, the geographical boundaries of a nation state provided the foundation for jurisdictional 
queries. Territoriality was considered a defining pillar of international law. For example, in the 1600s, 
the Treaty of Westphalia conceptualized a nation’s power as ending at its territorial borders.5 In this 
way, regardless of economic or military disparities, each state possessed exclusive jurisdiction within its 
own territory.6 However, the concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction was not unknown. For example, it 
existed in medieval Italy, sixteenth-century Brittany, and seventeenth-century Germany.7 Further, during 
the nineteenth century some European jurisdictions began to claim jurisdiction over extraterritorial 
acts committed by non-citizens that threatened the security of the state.8 Nonetheless, extraterritorial 
jurisdiction occurred as an exception, rather than as a rule. 
2.2. Twentieth century 
In 1927, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) delivered judgment in the Lotus9 case. 
This decision was a turning point in jurisdictional jurisprudence. The PCIJ considered whether 
Turkey, in instituting criminal proceedings against a French national over a collision on the high seas 
between a Turkish ship and a French ship resulting in the death of Turkish nationals, acted in conflict 
with international law.10 The French Government submitted that the Turkish courts, in order to have 
jurisdiction, must be able to identify a specific title to jurisdiction given to Turkey in international law.11 
Conversely, the Turkish Government took the view that it inherently had jurisdiction, provided such 
jurisdiction did not come into conflict with a principle of international law.12 The PCIJ stated:
‘International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding upon 
States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages 
generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the 
1 See, e.g., B. Perrin, ‘Taking a Vacation from the Law? Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction and Section 7(4.1) of the Criminal Code’, 
2009 Canadian Criminal Law Review 13, no. 2, p. 175, p. 178; American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States, 1987, § 101; R. Liivoja, ‘The Criminal Jurisdiction of States: A Theoretical Primer’, 2010 No Foundations: Journal for 
Extreme Legal Positivism 7, p. 25.
2 R. O’Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept’, 2004 Journal of International Criminal Justice 2, no. 3, pp. 735-760, p. 736. 
3 See, e.g., G.D. Triggs, International Law: Contemporary Principles and Practices, 2006, p. 344; D.J. Gerber, ‘Beyond Balancing: International 
Law Restraints on the Reach of National Laws’, 1984 Yale Journal of International Law 10, p. 189.
4 J.A. Zerk, ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Lessons for the Business and Human Rights Sphere From Six Regulatory Areas’ (Working Paper 
No. 59, Harvard Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, 2010), p. 13.
5 A. Parrish, ‘The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality’s Fifth Business’, 2008 Vanderbilt Law Review 61, no. 5, p. 1455, pp. 1463-1464, citing 
L. Gross, ‘The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948’, 1948 American Journal of International Law 42, p. 20, pp. 28-29. 
6 Ibid., p. 1464.
7 M. Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’, 1972-1973 British Yearbook of International Law 46, p. 145, p. 163. 
8 Ibid., pp. 157-158.
9 The S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey) (Judgment), [1927] PCIJ (ser. A) No. 10 .
10 The S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey) (Judgment), [1927] PCIJ (ser. A) No. 10, p. 5.
11 The S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey) (Judgment), [1927] PCIJ (ser. A) No. 10, p. 18.
12 Ibid.
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relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement 
of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.’13
 
And, while observing that ‘jurisdiction is certainly territorial’,14 the PCIJ found: 
‘It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction 
in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad, 
and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law. Such a view would 
only be tenable if international contained a general prohibition (…).’15
 
Finally, the Court concluded, in what has become a frequently cited passage and articulates what could 
be described as the ‘Lotus principle’, 
‘(…) Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that states may not extend the 
application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside 
their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited 
to certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the 
principles which it regards as best and most suitable.’16
In this way, the PCIJ established a presumption in favour of a nation’s extraterritorial jurisdiction, in the 
absence of a prohibitive rule. Some commentators attribute the development of the ‘effects test’ to the 
decision in Lotus having undermined ‘territoriality as a limiting constraint on legislative jurisdiction’.17 
Following the decision in Lotus, domestic courts began to grapple with the consequences of assertions 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Although some argue that jurisdiction based solely on territoriality 
well ‘served the goals of ‘predictability and efficiency’,18 by the mid-1900s the ‘heyday’ of territorial 
jurisdiction had begun its demise.19 As economies became increasingly interconnected there was an 
increased interest in regulating cross-border activities, such as transnational crime and the activities of 
multinational corporations.20 In some cases, the interest in extraterritoriality became associated with 
attempts to enforce human and indigenous rights.21 
The prosecution of war crimes after World War II was also pivotal in the development of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. The adjudication of Nazi war crimes in the Nuremberg tribunals 
‘transformed our understanding of jurisdiction’.22 The trials are often described as an exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction that sought to bring ‘accused war criminals to account on behalf of the entire 
world community of civilized nations.’23 Although it has been argued by some commentators that the 
allied forces were in fact exercising territorial jurisdiction as sovereigns over occupied territory,24 it 
is widely accepted that the Nuremberg trials were an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction based on 
the universality principle. Following Nuremberg, Israel’s prosecution of a member of the Gestapo for 
his involvement in administering the ‘final solution’ in Attorney General of the Government of Israel v 
13 Ibid. (emphasis added).
14 The S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey) (Judgment), [1927] PCIJ (ser. A) No. 10, p. 18.
15 Ibid., p. 19.
16 Ibid. (emphasis added).
17 Gerber, supra note 3, pp. 196-197.
18 Parrish, supra note 5, p. 1467.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p. 1469.
21 Ibid., p 1470.
22 H. Gluzman, ‘On Universal Jurisdiction – Birth, Life and a Near-Death Experience’, Bocconi School of Law Papers, Paper No. 2009-08/EN, 
p. 4, citing R. Teitel, ‘Nuremberg and its Legacy: Fifty Years Later’, in B. Cooper (ed.), War Crimes: the Legacy of Nuremberg, 1990, p. 50.
23 H. Gluzman, ‘On Universal Jurisdiction – Birth, Life and a Near-Death Experience’, Bocconi School of Law Papers, Paper No. 2009-08/EN, 
p. 4, citing W.B. Simons, ‘The Jurisdictional Bases of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg’, in G. Ginsburgs & V. Kudriavtsev 
(eds.), The Nuremberg Trial and International Law, 1990, p. 52. 
24 M.C. Bassiouni, ‘Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice’, 2001 Virginia Journal 
of International Law 42, p. 81, pp. 96-97.
71
Danielle Ireland-Piper
Eichmann,25 is also widely cited as an example of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Nonetheless, as late as 1990, 
the scholar Frederick Mann observed:
‘Normally no State is allowed to apply its legislation to foreigners in respect of acts done by them 
outside the dominions of the sovereign power enacting. That is a rule based on international 
law, by which one sovereign power is bound to respect the subjects and the rights of all over 
sovereign powers outside its own territory.’26
He was also of the view that ‘the nationality of the defendant is now probably an insufficient link to 
provide the courts of his home State with jurisdiction over him.’27 However, by the end of the twentieth 
and beginning of the twenty-first centuries, a number of treaties called on states to assert extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. For example, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Optional 
Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography together require parties to 
criminalise child prostitution whether or not the acts occur domestically or extraterritorially.28 All but 
two countries of the world are now party to the CRC, making it one of the most universally ratified of 
all United Nations conventions.29 Other examples include the international anti-corruption frameworks. 
The major international treaties on anti-corruption all either require or permit a degree of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.30 Similarly, international treaties relating to terrorism and torture also permit some assertions 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction. For example, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings calls upon parties to assert jurisdiction on the basis of both passive and active nationality,31 
and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism calls upon parties 
to assert active nationality jurisdiction.32 The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment also permits states to exercise active nationality jurisdiction, and 
passive nationality, where a state deems it to be ‘appropriate’.33 
2.3. Twenty-first century 
Many states now have domestic legislation with extraterritorial reach. By way of example, states as diverse 
as Singapore,34 Indonesia,35 Zimbabwe,36 Iraq,37 Russia,38 France,39 the United Kingdom,40 Mexico,41 
25 (1961) 36 International Law Reports 5.
26 F.A. Mann, Further Studies in International Law, 1990, p. 5.
27 Ibid.
28 See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, 
opened for signature 25 May 2000, 2171 UNTS 227 (entered into force 18 January 2002), Art. 1,3.
29 F. David, ‘Child Sex Tourism’, Australian Institute of Criminology, Trends and issues in crime and criminal justice, no. 156, June 2000. 
30 See, e.g., Convention on Combating the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, OECD (21 November 1997); 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption, UNCAC (31 October 2003); Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Organization 
of American States (29 March 1996); Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 1999 and its Additional Protocol, European Union 
(27 January 1999).
31 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, opened for signature 15 December 1997, 2149 UNTS 256 (entered 
into force 23 May 2001), Art. 6.
32 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, opened for signature 9 December 1999, 2178 UNTS 197 
(entered into force 10 April 2002), Art. 7(1).
33 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 
1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987), Art. 5.
34 For example, see Penal Code, (Singapore, cap. 224, 2008 rev. ed.), s. 3; Prevention of Corruption Act, (Singapore, cap. 241, 1993 rev. ed.), 
s. 37(1); and the decision in Public Prosecutor v Taw Cheng Kong, [1998] 2 SLR 410, [27]-[43].
35 For example, see Penal Code of Indonesia (1982), <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ffc09ae2.html> (last visited 12 September 2013), 
Art. 4. 
36 For example, see Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act (Zimbabwe) (2004), <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c45b64c2.html> 
(last visited 12 September 2013), s. 5. 
37 For example, see Criminal Code 1969 (Iraq), <http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/Iraqi_Penal_Code_1969.pdf> (last visited 
12 September 2013), ss. 2-4.
38 For example, see Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (1996), <http://www.russian-criminal-code.com/PartI/SectionI/Chapter2.
html> (last visited 12 September 2013), Art. 12.
39 For example, see Code Pénal [Penal Code] (France), <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Traductions/en-English/Legifrance-translations> (last 
visited 12 September 2013), Art. 113(6)-113(12).
40 For example, see Bribery Act 2010 (UK) c. 23, s. 12.
41 For example, see Código Penal Federal (Mexico) 1931, <http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=199697#LinkTarget_461>, (last 
visited 12 September 2013), Art. 4.
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Canada,42 the United States,43 Japan,44 Israel45 and Thailand46 have at least some legislative provisions 
with extraterritorial effect. Geographical conceptions of territory are ‘becoming a less salient feature of 
the international legal landscape.’47 States are acting on treaty obligations, reacting to world events, or 
seeking to achieve political objectives.48 Undoubtedly, high-profile terrorist attacks such as the infamous 
events in the United States in September 2001, and Internet leaks such as those by the organization 
‘Wikileaks’, have resulted in increased efforts by states to regulate extraterritorial conduct. 
The Internet poses particular challenges for jurisdictional frameworks. As Okoniewski observes, 
‘because anyone can view information on the Internet, every nation has an interest in regulating it (…) 
and determining which nation has jurisdiction over a particular issue can have a significant impact on 
the outcome’. 49 
3. Principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction
The principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction are now explored in further detail. Differential time and 
attention will be given to each principle, because some principles are less controversial than others and 
require less explanation. Nonetheless, the same three questions will be asked in relation to each principle:
1.  What is the particular principle of jurisdiction under discussion? 
2.  What is an example of that principle?
3.   Is there debate on the principle? 
3.1. The territoriality principle
3.1.1. What is the territorial principle of jurisdiction?
The territoriality principle is the most common basis of jurisdiction50 and is widely regarded as a 
manifestation of state sovereignty.51 At its simplest, the territoriality principle denotes that a state has 
jurisdiction over conduct that occurs within territorial borders. However, it has both subjective and 
objective limbs. Subjective territoriality describes the jurisdiction of a state over conduct that occurs 
entirely within that state’s borders. Objective territoriality refers to the jurisdiction of a state over conduct 
that only partially occurs in that state’s territory. In particular, a territorial conception of jurisdiction is 
deeply rooted in common-law countries. One reason for this in English-speaking jurisdictions is the 
need for trial by jury, and original conceptions of the jury being part of the community in which the 
crime was committed.52
3.1.2. What is an example of territorial jurisdiction? 
An example of subjective territorial jurisdiction is a murder committed in the physical territory of State A. 
The arrest, trial and imprisonment of the perpetrator in State A are on the basis of territorial jurisdiction. 
An example of objective territorial jurisdiction takes place on the border between two states, State A 
42 For example, see Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 7(4.1), <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-46/page-3.html> (last visited 
12 September 2013).
43 For example, see Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 18 USC § 3261(2000), <http://www.pubklaw.com/hi/pl106-523.pdf> 
(last visited 12 September 2013). 
44 For example, see Penal Code (Japan) (1907), <http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=2&re=02&dn=1&yo=penal+code
&x=0&y=0&ky=&page=1> (last visited 12 September 2013), Art. 3-5.
45 For example, see Penal Law of Israel (Israel) 199, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b60a4.html> (last visited 12 September 2013), 
ss. 13-17.
46 For example, see Criminal Code (Thailand) (1956), <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex_browse.details?p_lang=en&p_country= 
THA&p_classification=01.04&p_origin=COUNTRY&p_sortby=SORTBY_COUNTRY> (last visited 12 September 2013), s. 8.
47 M. Byers, ‘Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, A New Age’, 2001-2002 McGill Law Journal 47, p. 424.
48 See generally the discussion in D. Ireland-Piper, ‘Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction: Does the Long Arm of the Law Undermine the Rule 
of Law?’, 2012 Melbourne Journal of International Law 13, no. 1, p. 122.
49 E.A. Okoniewski, ‘Yahoo!, Inc. v. LICRA: The French Challenge to Free Expression on the Internet’, 2002 American University International 
Law Review 18, no. 1, pp. 310-311.
50 Zerk, supra note 4, p. 18.
51 A. Chehtman, The Philosophical Foundations of Extraterritorial Punishment, 2010, p. 56.
52 Akehurst, supra note 7, p. 152.
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and State B. A gun is fired across the border from State A into State B, where it causes injury. Although, 
the trigger was pulled in State A, the injury from the bullet occurred in State B. In that scenario, State B 
may assert jurisdiction on the basis of objective territorial jurisdiction. Another example of objective 
territorial jurisdiction is an offence relating to human trafficking. In order to take persons from State A 
into State B, preparations may be made in State A. The remaining parts of the conduct may occur in 
State B. This may also give rise to objective territorial jurisdiction. In both cases, if either the victim or 
the perpetrator is a national of a state other than State A or State B, that other state may also be able to 
assert jurisdiction based on the nationality principle. This is further discussed below in relation to the 
nationality principle. 
3.1.3. Is there debate on this principle?
From a theoretical standpoint, it is uncontroversial and universally recognised that a state may assert 
jurisdiction over activities in its own territory.53 It is commonly relied on. As Michael Akehurst has 
observed:
‘One of the main functions of a State is to maintain order within its own territory, so it is not 
surprising that the territorial principle is the most frequently invoked ground for criminal 
jurisdiction (…).’54
Nonetheless, objective territoriality may involve competing jurisdictional claims.55 To use the human 
trafficking example above, although parts of the conduct will have taken place in State A, others were 
consummated in State B. If each of State A and State B wished to assert jurisdiction, this may give rise to 
a competing claim. International law does not clearly set out a hierarchy of jurisdictional claims, other 
than by reference to principles of jurisdictional restraint, such as comity or non-interference. These and 
other principles of jurisdictional restraint will be discussed in greater detail in Part III. 
3.2. The nationality principle
3.2.1. What is the nationality principle of jurisdiction? 
The nationality principle authorises extraterritorial jurisdiction by a state over its nationals, even where 
the conduct may have occurred extraterritorially. Like the territorial principle of jurisdiction, this 
principle also has two limbs. If jurisdiction is asserted over a national accused of being a perpetrator of 
extraterritorial conduct, this is described as ‘active nationality’. If the national is a victim of extraterritorial 
conduct, then jurisdiction over that national is termed ‘passive nationality’. Civil-law jurisdictions rely 
on the nationality principle to a ‘far greater extent’56 than common-law countries. For example, countries 
such as the United States, Canada and Australia tend to assert nationality jurisdiction on an ad-hoc 
basis, and for specific offences. This means that not all criminal offences in those jurisdictions will have 
extraterritorial effect, and they are generally presumed not to unless otherwise specified. In contrast, 
European countries such as France and Switzerland have a broader range of offences with extraterritorial 
reach. For example, the French Penal Code provides: 
‘French criminal law is applicable to any felony, as well as to any misdemeanour punishable by 
imprisonment, committed by a French national or by a foreigner outside the territory of the 
republic when the victim is of French nationality at the time of the offence.’57
53 Triggs, supra note 3; Chehtman, supra note 51, p. 56.
54 Akehurst, supra note 7, p. 152. 
55 Gerber, supra note 3. 
56 Akehurst, supra note 7, p. 152.
57 See French Penal Code (France), Art. 113-6, 113-7 (15 March 2013) <http://195.83.177.9/upl/pdf/code_33.pdf> (last visited 12 September 
2013). 
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This provision is an example of both active and passive personality jurisdiction. There is generally 
a connection between the prohibition on the extradition of nationals and the broad assertion of 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over nationals.58 
3.2.2. What is an example of the nationality principle?
Domestic child sexual offences with extraterritorial reach are an example of active nationality jurisdiction. 
State A may legislate to criminalise sexual activities between its nationals and children, regardless of 
where those activities take place. It may seek the extradition of the national or, if the activity is discovered 
on the national’s return to State A, simply prosecute in much the same way as for a territorial offence. 
An example of passive nationality jurisdiction is State A legislating to make it an offence to recklessly or 
intentionally harm, kill or seriously injure a State A citizen or resident anywhere in the world. 
3.2.3. Is there debate on the nationality principle? 
States are described as having ‘an unlimited right to base jurisdiction on the nationality of the accused.’59 
However, there is uncertainty as to how nationality is to be defined. Traditional models of citizenship and 
nationality have been altered by globalisation60 and the increased mobility of persons. May articulates 
this difficulty when he asserts that it is a ‘mistake to say that there are citizens and yet for it be unclear 
what political community these citizens are connected to.’61 
International law is generally neutral toward a grant of nationality, provided the granting state does 
not breach certain international obligations, such as those under the Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness.62 This means that determination as to who is a ‘national’ for the purpose of the nationality 
principle is a matter largely left to individual states. By way of example, Australia’s child-sex tourism 
laws assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over citizens and residents, and persons and corporate entities.63 
Given that residents have no right to vote in parliamentary elections, this raises issues as to the legitimacy 
of assertions of authority over Australian residents overseas. It is also problematic in that residents 
are not always considered nationals in other aspects of the law, and, therefore, residents are not truly 
nationals under Australian law. In this way, assertions of jurisdiction over residents may be outside the 
nationality principle. For dual citizens, there is also the possibility of persons being subject to multiple, 
and potentially conflicting, legislative regimes. Rubenstein observes: 
‘Domestic laws about who is and who is not a citizen vary significantly, and laws relating to 
citizenship in each of the different states are also different. As a result, many people hold more 
than one nationality by fulfilling the formal requirements for citizenship in more than one 
domestic legal framework.’64
The idea that every individual may be subject to the laws of multiple states in all places, and at all times, 
is described as ‘intolerable’.65 Further, there is also debate on the scope of both the active and the passive 
limbs of the nationality principle.
Active nationality
A report for the Harvard Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative suggests that states regard the active 
nationality principle as the strongest basis for direct extraterritorial jurisdiction.66 However, some 
58 Z. Deen-Rascmany, ‘Modernising the Nationality Exception: Is the Non-extradition of Residents a Better Rule?’, 2006 Nordic Journal of 
International Law 30, p. 75. 
59 Akehurst, supra note 7, p. 156.
60 K. Rubenstein, ‘Citizenship in an Age of Globalisation: The Cosmopolitan Citizen?’, 2007 Law in Context 25, no. 1, p. 88.
61 L. May, Global Justice and Due Process, 2011, p. 198.
62 Triggs, supra note 3, p. 344. 
63 See, Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s. 272.6.
64 Rubenstein, supra note 60, pp. 90-91.
65 1928 Law Quarterly Review 44, pp. 154, 161 as cited in M. Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’, 1972-1973 British Yearbook of 
International Law 46, p. 165.
66 Zerk, supra note 4, p. 13. 
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commentators express concern as to the underlying philosophical justifications for the principle. For 
example, Chehtman claims that, ‘as a basis for criminal jurisdiction, the nationality principle is altogether 
unjustified at the bar of justice.’67 He argues that ‘individuals in any given state lack an interest in having 
that state’s criminal laws enforced against them or their co-nationals (or co-residents) abroad.’68 By way 
of example, and referring to assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction by Spain, he argues: 
‘Inhabitants of Spain may feel horrified by a particular crime committed outside its territory by 
a co-national, but their belief in the system of criminal laws under which they live being in force 
is not undermined by these offences.’69 
In contrast, Arnell argues that the nationality principle is symbolic of an evolution from narrow, self-
interested territorial interests to a broader collective interest in the conduct of nationals overseas.70 He 
suggests that greater reliance on the nationality principle is justified on three grounds. First, he argues 
that given that the conduct of nationals overseas is already regulated on an ad-hoc basis, a standard 
framework should be developed to govern its use more broadly.71 It is possible that this has merit; a 
standardised framework would allow for greater transparency and consistency in the employment of 
the nationality principle. Second, he argues that exercises of jurisdiction on the basis of nationality can 
be used to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial.72 Arnell refers to the United Kingdom, where the 
rights to a fair trial, liberty and freedom from retrospective legislation are all part of municipal law, and 
therefore would be guaranteed to nationals being prosecuted for extraterritorial criminal conduct. While 
this assurance of basic human rights is certainly desirable, the reverse could equally be true. Nationals 
of states which do not guarantee those same human rights could equally assert jurisdiction over the 
conduct of their nationals overseas, thereby depriving a person of those rights. Finally, Arnell argues 
that the mobility of people has changed the relationship between citizen and state to the extent where 
territorial boundaries are less relevant, and so the relationship ought to be governed by the nationality 
principle.73 
Passive nationality 
The existence and use of the passive nationality principle is particularly controversial, perhaps because 
of the particular challenge it poses for territorial-based systems of regulation.74 Of all the grounds 
discussed in this paper, it is the only one not included in the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with 
Respect to Crime.75 As a ground of criminal jurisdiction, it has been described as the ‘most contested in 
contemporary International Law.’76 In his dissenting judgment in the Lotus case, Judge Moore expressed 
his reservation on the passive nationality principle thus: 
‘[A]n inhabitant of a great commercial city (...) may in the course of an hour unconsciously 
fall under the operation of a number of foreign criminal codes (...) this (...) is at variance not 
only with the principle of exclusive jurisdiction of a State over its own territory, but also with 
the equally well settled principle that a person visiting a foreign country (...) falls under the 
dominion of the local law.77
67 Chehtman, supra note 51, p. 66.
68 Ibid., p. 67.
69 Ibid., p. 61.
70 P. Arnell, ‘The Case for Nationality Based Jurisdiction’, 2001 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 50, no. 4, p. 961, cited in 
M.D. Evans (ed.), International Law, 2006.
71 Ibid., p. 959. 
72 Ibid., p. 955.
73 Ibid., p. 960.
74 Zerk, supra note 4, p. 20. 
75 Text with comment, supplement to 1935 American Journal of International Law 29. 
76 Chehtman, supra note 51, p. 67.
77 S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey) (Judgement), [1927] PCIJ (ser A) No 10, cited in G.D. Triggs, International Law: Contemporary Principles and 
Practices, 2006, p. 355. 
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In particular, the passive nationality principle has potential to create legal uncertainty. While persons 
are generally aware of their own nationality, they may not be aware of the nationality of the persons 
with whom they interact. For example, a person in State A, when he or she acts, may not be aware of the 
nationality of Citizen X, and therefore will not be in a position to assess the legal framework in which 
his or her conduct will be assessed.78 Nonetheless, examples of state practice indicate the international 
community is increasingly willing to accept assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis of the 
passive nationality principle.79 This is particularly so where the conduct constitutes a serious crime such 
as terrorism, hijacking or hostage-taking.
3.3. The universality principle
3.3.1. What is the universality principle?
The universality principle refers to the right of states to assert jurisdiction over serious international 
crimes regardless of where the conduct occurs, or the nationality of the perpetrator(s).80 The theory is 
that some crimes are so offensive to international peace and security that all states are regarded as having 
a legitimate interest in their proscription and punishment.81 Unlike other grounds of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, which demand some connection with the regulating state (such as the nationality of the 
perpetrator or the victim), this principle provides every state with a basis to prosecute certain international 
crimes. The scope of universal jurisdiction is conceived of in two different ways: conditional and 
absolute. A conditional conception of universal jurisdiction requires the presence of the accused in the 
prosecuting state.82 An absolute conception, in contrast, does not require the presence of the accused.83 
This is sometimes described as ‘universal jurisdiction in absentia’. The latter is far more controversial, and 
is not widely accepted as a sound basis for jurisdiction.84
3.3.2. What is an example of universal jurisdiction? 
In earlier times, the reach of extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis of universality was limited to 
piracy and the slave trade.85 For example, international law grants every state the authority to assert 
jurisdiction over piracy and slave trading because those crimes are ‘prototypal offences that (...) have 
long been considered the enemies of humanity.’86 It has expanded since World War II, to the extent that 
there is now no firm consensus as to what crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction.87 Prosecutions 
over war crimes and crimes against humanity in the post-World War II era also relied heavily on the 
universality principle.88 As noted earlier, the prosecution of war crimes in the Nuremberg tribunals and 
Israel’s prosecution in Eichmann are considered examples of universal jurisdiction. The court before 
which Eichmann was tried in Israel found that:89 
‘The[se] abhorrent crimes (…) are crimes not under Israeli law alone. These crimes which 
offended the whole of mankind and shocked the conscience of nations are grave offences 
against the law of nations itself. Therefore, far from international law negating or limiting the 
jurisdiction of countries with respect to such crimes (…) the international law is in need of the 
judicial and legislative authorities of every country to give effect to its penal injunctions and 
bring criminals to trial. The jurisdiction to try crimes under international law is universal.’ 
78 Zerk, supra note 4, p. 20. 
79 Triggs, supra note 3, pp. 355, 356. 
80 Zerk, supra note 4, p. 20. 
81 Ibid.
82 H. Gluzman, ‘On Universal Jurisdiction – Birth, Life and a Near-Death Experience’, Bocconi School of Law Papers, Paper No. 2009-08/EN, p. 4. 
83 Ibid.
84 See, for example, the discussion in O’Keefe, supra note 2, pp. 748-750.
85 D.F. Orentlicher, ‘Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with Democratic Principles’, in T.J. Biersteker et al. (eds.), International 
Law and International Relations, 2007, p. 205.
86 K.C. Randall, ‘Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law’, 1988 Texas Law Review 66, p. 785, p. 788, citing O. Schachter, International 
Law in Theory and Practice, 1985), pp. 240-265. 
87 Orentlicher, supra note 85, p. 205.
88 Randall, supra note 86, p. 788. 
89 36 ILR 5, [12].
77
Danielle Ireland-Piper
3.3.3. Is there debate on the universality principle?
There is little to no debate on the existence of the universality principle. However, there is some debate 
as to its scope. Critics of universal jurisdiction argue that the courts and prosecutors ‘are completely 
unaccountable to the citizens of the nation whose fate they are relying upon.’90 Since absolute universal 
jurisdiction allows prosecution by any country at any time, there are also concerns as to due process. For 
example, Fletcher warns that universal jurisdiction may result in ‘hounding an accused in one court after 
another until the victims are satisfied that justice has been done.’91 
The response to Belgian assertions of universal jurisdiction indicates that states are still resistant to 
a broad conception of universal jurisdiction. Criminal prosecutions were instituted in Belgian courts 
against current and former leaders of Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Cote  d’Ivoire, the Palestinian Authority, the United States, and others.92 Individuals such as the then 
United States Secretary of State, Colin Powell, were named. There was a strong reaction, particularly 
from the United States and Israel. Israel withdrew its ambassador. The United States warned that Belgium 
risked losing its status as the headquarters of NATO, and that US officials would stop visiting Belgium 
if it did not further restrict its laws on universal jurisdiction.93 Consequently, Belgium bowed to this 
pressure, and amended its laws, ‘leaving scant scope for universal jurisdiction’.94 
3.4. The protective principle
3.4.1. What is the protective principle?
The protective principle is invoked to justify claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a regulating state for 
offences against its national interest. This might include the security, integrity, sovereignty or government 
functions of that state.95 In particular, a state may rely on the protective principle because acts that 
threaten its security or national interest may not be illegal in the state where they are being performed.96
 
3.4.2. What is an example of protective principle jurisdiction?
The protective principle has been used to prosecute extraterritorial offences relating to counterfeiting 
currency, desecration of flags, economic crimes, forgery of official documents such as passports and 
visas, and political offences (such as treason).97 For example, in Joyce v DPP,98 an American citizen gained 
a British passport by fraudulent means and worked for German radio during World War II. It was argued 
on behalf of the accused that the United Kingdom did not have jurisdiction to try a non-national for a 
crime committed outside British territory. The Court rejected this argument on the basis that: 
‘No principle of comity demands that a state should ignore the crime of treason committed 
against it outside its territory. On the contrary a proper regard for its own security requires that 
all those who commit that crime, whether they commit it within or without the realm should 
be amenable to its laws.’99 
3.4.3. Is there debate on the protective principle?
Given uncertainties as to what constitutes a sufficient threat to ‘national interest’, the protective principle is 
open to abuse.  While jurisdiction over counterfeiting of state documents is unobjectionable, some states 
have made far wider claims. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, companies which purchased goods 
90 J. Goldsmith & S.D. Krasner, The Limits of Idealism, 2003, p. 51. 
91 G.P. Fletcher, ‘Against Universal Jurisdiction’, 2003 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1, no. 3, p. 580, p. 582.
92 Orentlicher, supra note 85, p. 205.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Triggs, supra note 3; Zerk, supra not 4, p. 19; and generally, M.B. Krizek, ‘The Protective Principle of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Brief 
History and an Application of the Principle to Espionage as an Illustration of Current United States Practice’, 1988 Boston University 
International Law Journal 6, p. 337.
96 Akehurst, supra note 7, p. 169.
97 Triggs, supra note 3, pp. 356-357; Zerk, supra note 4, p. 19; and generally, Krizek, supra note 95.
98 Joyce v DPP, [1946] AC 347.
99 Ibid., 372.
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from the United States and undertook not to sell on those goods to communist countries were liable for 
prosecution in the United States if they breached that undertaking.100 The Hungarian Criminal Code 
once spoke sweepingly of offences against ‘a fundamental interest relating to the democratic, political 
and economic order.’101 Notoriously, Nazi Germany prosecuted extraterritorial acts that threatened the 
racial purity of the nation.102 As Akehurst has stated,103 
‘A State is entitled to impose its ideology on its nationals and on all persons present in its 
territory; it is also entitled to oblige both categories of persons to take its side in its struggles 
against other States. But it is not entitled to make such demands on aliens living in foreign 
countries.’ 
Nonetheless, most commentators accept the legitimacy of the protective principle. For example, 
Chehtman accepts that individuals within a given state have a collective interest in the security of their 
state being protected.104 He argues that ‘the fact that a given state can abuse a right it has is hardly a 
conclusive argument against it initially holding that right.’105 Similarly, Triggs notes that the protective 
principle is open to abuse, but observes that reliance on the principle is generally limited to exceptional 
cases and particular categories of offences.106 She also suggests that concerns about terrorism have led to 
a growing acceptance by the community of assertions of extraterritoriality on the basis of the protective 
principle.107
3.5. The effects principle
3.5.1. What is the effects principle?
Commentators on extraterritoriality often refer to the effects principle as an additional basis for asserting 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. The effects principle allows states to assert jurisdiction over conduct occurring 
extraterritoriality if that conduct has an effect on their territory. The effects principle is easily confused 
with objective territoriality. However, it differs from objective territoriality in that no constituent element 
of the offence takes place within the territory of the asserting state.108 
3.5.2. What is an example of effects principle jurisdiction?
Legislation drafted as applying in State A to ‘conduct both within or having an effect within the territory’109 
of State A, would be an assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis of the effects principle. 
Jurisdiction on the basis of offences that merely produced effects in their territory has been claimed by 
various states including the United States, Argentina, Mexico, China, Cuba and Italy.110
3.5.3. Is there debate on the effects principle?
The scope of the effects principle is controversial, particularly regarding the proposition that a purely 
economic effect would suffice.111 In expanding the jurisdiction of the regulating state, the effects principle 
fails to provide an effective framework for protecting the interests of other states which might be affected 
by this expansion. Parrish is also of the view that the effects principle has expanded the potential for 
jurisdictional conflict between states. He describes it as the ‘beginning of the end to meaningful territorial 
100 Akehurst, supra note 7, p. 158. 
101 Ibid., p. 159 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid.
104 Chehtman, supra note 51, pp. 71-21.
105 Ibid., p. 73. 
106 Ibid., p. 358.
107 Ibid., p. 358.
108 O’Keefe, supra note 2, p. 739.
109 See, for example, Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 38 (1965).
110 Akehurst, supra note 7, p. 153.
111 Zerk, supra note 4, p. 19.
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limits to legislative jurisdiction’,112 and as ‘problematic for both conceptual and pragmatic reasons’.113 He 
argues that it is ‘unconstrainable’114 and gives ‘license to near universal jurisdiction’.115 
Akehurst also sees the effects principle as a ‘slippery slope’ towards universal jurisdiction.116 He 
cites the example of a person committing arson and destroying a factory, and, as a result, the company 
owning the factory becomes insolvent, the effects of which could be felt all over the world.117 In his view, 
the effects principle is only workable if jurisdiction is limited to the state where the primary effect is felt, 
and even then only where the effect is substantial.118
In summary, the effects principle is one of the most highly contentious bases on which to assert 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Its scope is not well articulated, and it is prone to abuse. In a globalised 
world, one thing can affect many others, and therefore the effects principle should not be considered a 
legitimate basis upon which to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. It is also superfluous in the sense that it 
is hard to imagine a state having a legitimate jurisdictional interest in a conduct that would not otherwise 
be covered by the objective territoriality or protective principles, or by other less contentious bases of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
3.6. Preliminary conclusions on the principles of jurisdiction in international law 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction is useful in seeking to regulate transnational crime, such as child-sex tourism, 
money laundering, drug trafficking, human trafficking and migrant smuggling. These activities are not 
confined to territorial borders, and therefore, neither should the relevant legal frameworks be. However, 
reliance on extraterritorial jurisdiction may have the following consequences:
 – Given that a country other than the country in which an offence occurred may assert jurisdiction and 
seek to prosecute, a government’s promise of amnesties are undermined;
 – an accused person may be subject to multiple prosecutions for the same conduct, with no foreseeable 
end point; and
 – persons may be unable to know or ascertain each and every law in each and every state that may have 
grounds for jurisdiction over their conduct, thereby creating legal uncertainty. 
These consequences could be greatly mitigated by extraterritorial jurisdiction being permitted only over 
crimes that are the subject of international treaties, and by the development of a multilateral procedural 
framework setting out model laws on prosecutorial discretion, and due process. Such a framework is 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, this paper will provide examples of ways in which individual 
rights may be undermined by assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction, and then consider whether the 
abuse of rights doctrine is helpful in regulating extraterritoriality. 
Part II
This Part provides examples of the some of the problems that can arise in domestic prosecutions of 
extraterritorial conduct, and undermine the ability of an individual to enjoy a fair trial. In particular, 
it considers: the lack of consistency in domestic conceptions of ‘ne bis in idem’ or ‘double jeopardy’; 
extradition and mutual assistance frameworks; and the inconsistent application of constitutional 
protections to persons accused of extraterritorial criminal conduct. 
112 Parrish, supra note 5, p. 1470.
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid., p. 1478.
115 Ibid.
116 Akehurst, supra note 7, p. 154.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid., pp. 154-155.
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1. The lack of a consistent transnational principle of ne bis in idem
The principle that a person should not be prosecuted more than once for the same conduct is expressed 
in the maxim ne bis in idem (‘ne bis’).119 In the common-law world, the ne bis principle is more commonly 
referred to as ‘double jeopardy’.120 Although some may argue that there are differences between the two 
concepts, both are premised on ‘similar considerations of fairness, just treatment, and respect for an 
individual’s dignity’.121 For ease of reference, the term ‘double jeopardy’ will be used, and, unless stated 
otherwise, is taken to encompass both. The principle has a long history dating back to ancient Greece and 
Rome,122 and derives from the Roman Law principle, nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadam causa.123 
Despite this long history, the principle does not necessarily exist at the transnational level. For example, 
the protection granted by Article 14(7) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) is limited to multiple prosecutions in one state, and not as between states.124 This leaves a person 
accused of an extraterritorial crime, for which more than one state asserts jurisdiction, in a regulatory 
void. While Article 20 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court also provides some 
protection against double jeopardy, this protection only applies to persons prosecuted for genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.125 Therefore, it is generally not relevant 
to prosecutions of other kinds of transnational crime such as money laundering, migrant smuggling, 
human trafficking, child sex tourism, cybercrime or other criminal offences. 
The Model Law on Extradition provides: ‘[e]xtradition may be refused, if there has been a final 
judgment rendered and enforced against the person sought in [the country adopting the law] [or in a third 
state] in respect of the offence for which extradition is requested.’126 However, the language is discretionary 
and, as a model law, merely aspirational. For example, in the United States, the prevailing view is the ‘dual 
sovereignty’ doctrine. The effect of this doctrine is to allow each sovereign state to prosecute criminal 
conduct regardless of previous action in relation to the same conduct by other sovereign states.127 This 
doctrine is ‘inequitable and ineffective at protecting the rights of criminal defendants’.128 For example, 
consider the prosecution of Gabe Watson in the United States for conduct that had already been the 
subject of a conviction and subsequent term of imprisonment in Australia. Watson, a citizen of the 
United States, served 18 months’ imprisonment in Australia for the manslaughter of his wife on a diving 
trip in Australia in 2003.129 Dissatisfied with the lenient sentence, an Alabama court indicted Watson for 
murder for money and kidnap by trick,130 and was successful in seeking his extradition from Australia.131 
119 G. Conway, ‘Ne Bis in Idem in International Law’, 2003 International Criminal Law Review 3, no. 3, p. 217. 
120 See generally, L. Finlay, ‘Does the International Criminal Court Protect Against Double Jeopardy: An Analysis of Article 20 of the Rome 
Statute’, 2009 UC Davis Journal of International Law & Policy 15, no. 2, p. 221.
121 D.E. Lopez, ‘Not Twice for the Same: How the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine is Used to Circumvent Non Bis In Idem’, 2000 Vanderbilt Journal 
of Transnational Law 33.
122 A.J. Colangelo, ‘Double Jeopardy and Multiple Sovereigns: A Jurisdictional Theory’, 2008 Washington University Law Review 86, no. 4, p. 778.
123 See, Conway, supra note 119, p. 221; Finlay, supra note 120, p. 223; Lopez, supra note 121, p. 1267.
124 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly 
Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Art. 49.
125 See Art. 5 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF.183/9* (entered into force 1 July 2002). Note that 
Art. 20 of this Statute provides as follows:
 ‘1. Except as provided in this Statute, no person shall be tried before the Court with respect to conduct which formed the basis of crimes 
for which the person has been convicted or acquitted by the Court.
 2. No person shall be tried by another court for a crime referred to in article 5 for which that person has already been convicted or 
acquitted by the Court. 
 3. No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court with 
respect to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other court: (a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from 
criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or (b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in 
accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international law and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, 
was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.’
126 UNODC, 2004, <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/model_law_extradition.pdf> (last visited 13 September 2013).
127 Lopez, supra note 121, p. 1266.
128 Ibid.
129 See R v Watson; Ex parte A-G, [2009] QCA 279. 
130 T. Thompson, ‘California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger Signs Extradition Order on Gabe Watson’, The Courier Mail (online), 
15 November 2010, <http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/california-governor-arnold-schwarzenegger-signs-extradition-
order-on-gabe-watson/story-e6freoof-1225953440198> (last visited 13 September 2013). 
131 Note, the State of California also sought extradition from Australia, and ordered Watson’s extradition to Alabama. 
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Under Australian law, there is an ‘extradition objection’ if a person has undergone punishment under 
the law of Australia in respect of the extradition offence, or another offence constituted by the same 
conduct as the extradition offence.132 Therefore, although the offences for which Watson was indicted 
in the United States were technically different from those in Australia, the conduct in question was 
the same conduct and should have been caught by Section 7(e). It is unclear as to why the Australian 
Government was not prevented by its own legislation from extraditing Watson. Nonetheless, he was 
extradited. Ultimately, the case against Watson was dismissed on the basis of insufficient evidence.133 
However, if the case had gone to trial, he may have been tried, convicted and punished in two different 
jurisdictions. By contrast, in January 2012 a court in Mexico refused to extradite Sandra Ávila-Beltrán to 
the United States for drug charges, on the basis that the charges related to conduct that had already been 
the subject of a prosecution in Mexico.134 Perhaps the key difference between Ávila-Beltrán and Watson 
is that the former is a citizen of Mexico, whereas Watson was not a citizen of Australia. Perhaps Australia 
would have gone further to protect its own citizen from another trial arising out of the same conduct. 
If so, that in itself is problematic, as it creates uncertainties and is inconsistent with the notion that all 
persons are equal before the law. Notably, international law does not obligate a sovereign state to enforce 
another state’s penal judgments.135
The double jeopardy principle is recognised in many constitutions of the world. As at 1993, some 
form of protection from double jeopardy is included in the constitutions of over 50 countries.136 However, 
constitutionalisation of the double jeopardy principle does not necessarily mean greater protection. For 
example, the principle appears in Singapore’s Constitution, but the protection can be expressly waived by 
a superior court quashing a conviction, an acquittal, or the ordering of a retrial.137 In some countries, the 
protection afforded is not constitutionally protected at all, although it may form part of the common law 
or be provided for in legislation.138 The variances between domestic double jeopardy protections create 
uncertainty for persons accused of extraterritorial crimes, where more than one state may have claim 
to jurisdiction. This is problematic because states are increasingly asserting extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction and so are more likely to share concurrent jurisdiction over the same accused persons. 
2. Extradition and mutual legal assistance 
The ability for individuals to receive fair treatment under extradition and mutual legal assistance 
frameworks is also limited. The removal of Julian Moti from the Solomon Islands to Australia is an 
example of government officials cutting corners and undermining due process in order to secure the 
presence of an accused person. 
In December 2007, Mr Moti was deported from the Solomon Islands and, on arrival in Australia, 
prosecuted under Australian law for child sexual offences.139 The charges referred to a time when Mr Moti 
was a resident of Vanuatu, and were asserted on the basis of the active nationality principle (Mr Moti has 
Australian citizenship). The Moti case has been a high-profile one, as Mr Moti was the Attorney-General 
132 Section 7(e) of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth). 
133 J. Coglan, ‘Gabe Watson murder trial thrown out’, ABC News (online), 24 February 2012, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-02-24/
gabe-watson-murder-trial-thrown-out/3849836?section=qld> (last visited 13 September 2013).
134 H. Nelson Goodson, ‘Mexican Federal Judge Cited Double Jeopardy To Prevent Female Druglord Extradition To The U.S.’, on H. Nelson 
Goodson, Hispanic News Network USA Blog, 12 January 2012, <http://hngwiusa.wordpress.com/2012/01/13/mexican-federal-judge-
cited-double-jeopardy-to-prevent-female-druglord-extradition-to-the-u-s/> (last visited 13 September 2013).
135 L. Ballard, ‘The Recognition and Enforcement of International Criminal Court Judgments in U.S. Courts’, 1997 Columbia Human Rights Law 
Review 29, no. 1, p. 173.
136 M.C. Bassiouni, ‘Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent 
Protections in National Constitutions’, 1993 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 3, no. 2, p. 289; Finlay, supra note 120, 
p. 224. 
137 Art. 11(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Singapore, 9 August 1965) provides, ‘A person who has been convicted or 
acquitted of an offence shall not be tried again for the same offence except where the conviction or acquittal has been quashed and a 
retrial ordered by a court superior to that by which he was convicted or acquitted.’ (emphasis added)
138 For example, in Australia the principle of double jeopardy is not protected by the Constitution, and is instead determined by common 
law and subject to variance by statute. See, e.g., in South Australia, the Criminal Law Consolidation (Double Jeopardy) Amendment 
Act 2008(SA); in New South Wales, the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Amendment (Double Jeopardy) Act 2006 No 69 (NSW); in Tasmania, 
ss. 392-4 of the Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas.); in Victoria, ss. 327(H), 327 (M) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009I (Vic.).
139 R v Moti, [2009] 235 FLR 320.
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of the Solomon Islands. Three days before his deportation to Australia, it was officially published in 
the Solomon Island Gazette that Moti had been removed from appointment as Attorney-General.140 Not 
surprisingly, then, the case has been the subject of media attention and speculation as to the potential 
political motives of the Australian Government in pursuing the case. For example, Purcell suggests that 
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the case was really about asserting Australia’s foreign policy 
objectives, rather than the alleged conduct at issue.141 Purcell asks: 
‘[W]as the Crimes (Child Sex Tourism) Act passed with the intention of enabling the Australian 
prosecution authorities to launch a prosecution against a person who resided in Vanuatu and the 
Solomons and who happened to take out Australian citizenship but had not lived in Australia 
since student days and is currently living in the Solomons, to be tried in Australia for offences 
allegedly committed when he was a citizen of Vanuatu?’142 
The political agenda in Moti’s case was not denied by the Australian Government. In the written argument, 
the Crown conceded that: 
‘[T]he Australian High Commissioner to the Solomon Islands, Mr Cole, on a number of 
occasions requested the AFP to investigate the applicant, and that the motivation was largely to 
prevent the applicant from becoming the Attorney-General in the Solomon Islands.’143
Ultimately, the case went on appeal all the way to the High Court of Australia, where it was stayed as 
an abuse of process. This case illustrates the ‘enormous discretion’144 given to prosecutors in deciding 
whether to prosecute an extraterritorial crime, and the need for the development of prosecutorial 
guidelines in relation to extraterritorial offences. It also demonstrates that extradition and mutual 
assistance procedures and proceedings can be fraught with political tensions, and influenced by broader 
foreign policy objectives. 
Another example of abnormalities or illegalities in the extradition process is the Ker-Frisbie doctrine 
in the United States. In essence the doctrine provides that anomalies or illegalities in the extradition 
process will not bar prosecution in United States courts. In Ker v Illinois,145 the US Supreme Court held 
that ‘such forcible abduction is no sufficient reason why the party should not answer when brought 
within the jurisdiction of the court which has the right to try him for such an offense, and presents no 
valid objection to his trial in such court’.146 This was again upheld in Frisbie v Collins.147
An accused person may also find it difficult to obtain foreign evidence.148 It is much easier for 
prosecutors to access mutual legal assistance mechanisms than it is for an individual accused person. 
For example, the mutual legal assistance treaties to which the US is party ‘regularize foreign evidence 
gathering for prosecutors and explicitly prevent their use by criminal defendants.’149 This is concerning, 
because ‘when the ability to compel evidence is unequal, accuracy and fairness norms (…) can be 
illusory’.150 
140 Ibid., [13].
141 F.J. Purnell SC, ‘The Julian Moti Affair and Double Jeopardy’, (25 October 2006) Civil Liberties Australia, <http://www.cla.asn.au/Articles/
Moti%20Affair%20-%20Purnell061024.pdf> (last visite 13 September 2013). 
142 Ibid.
143 Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, ‘Respondent’s Summary of Argument’, Julian Ronald Moti v R, (No. 47 of 2010) 3 
(emphasis added).
144 E.S. Podger, ‘Defensive Territoriality: A New Paradigm for the Prosecution of Extraterritorial Business Crimes’, 2002 Georgia Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 31, no. 1, p. 24.
145 119 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1886)
146 Ibid.
147 342 U.S. 519 (U.S. 1952).
148 L.S. Richardson, ‘Convicting the Innocent in Transnational Criminal Cases: A Comparative Institutional Analysis Approach to the Problem’, 
2008 Berkeley Journal of International Law 26, no. 1, p. 62, p. 64.
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid., p. 67.
83
Danielle Ireland-Piper
3. Constitutional guarantees 
Many states grant some form of due process rights to persons subject to legal proceedings in that 
jurisdiction. However, due process rights may be applied differently to prosecutions of territorial conduct 
than to prosecutions of extraterritorial conduct. For example, in R v Hape the Supreme Court of Canada 
found that Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which guarantees a right against 
‘unreasonable search or seizure’, does not apply extraterritorially to investigations conducted overseas 
by Canadian officials.151 The Court held that because Canada was required to respect the sovereignty 
of other states, ‘extraterritorial enforcement is not possible’152 and, therefore, given that ‘enforcement 
is necessary for the Charter to apply, extraterritorial application of the Charter is impossible’.153 Pierre-
Huges Verdier argues that the decision in R v Hape departs from the previous line of authority that Charter 
rights apply to criminal investigations conducted abroad, provided they did not generate ‘objectionable 
extraterritorial effects’.154 In R v Klassen,155 the Court confirmed R v Hape as authority for the proposition 
that the Canadian Charter of Rights does not apply outside of Canada.156 
While this is just one example in one country, it is illustrative of the way in which the ability of an 
individual to enjoy a fair trial may be compromised in prosecutions of extraterritorial criminal conduct. 
A comprehensive analysis of the ingredients of a fair trial is beyond the scope of this paper. However, for 
current purposes a fair trial is taken to be a trial that provides certainty, equality, and review of executive 
and administrative action. For example, Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
provides that ‘all are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection 
of the law’.157 This could be argued to prohibit differential treatment of persons accused of extraterritorial, 
as opposed to territorial, offences. Article 10 is also relevant. It states: ‘Everyone is entitled in full equality 
to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights 
and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.’158 Further, Article 14(1) of the ICCPR provides: 
‘All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals’, and that in ‘the determination of any criminal 
charge (…) everyone shall be entitled to a fair (…) hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law.’159 
The requirement that all persons be equal before the courts would arguably require states to 
provide the same procedural and substantive rights to persons accused of extraterritorial offences as 
to those accused of domestic offences. As shown above, the lack of a transnational principle of double 
jeopardy creates uncertainty; and the ability of an individual to utilize extradition and mutual assistance 
frameworks creates inequality, as does the potential for a state to preclude constitutional guarantees from 
applying extraterritorially. 
Part III
As set out in Part I, there are several bases on which states have a right to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
However, as suggested in Part II, this right to assert jurisdiction may compromise the rights of individuals, 
particularly with respect to fair trial rights. In that connection, Part III now considers whether the ‘abuse 
of rights’ doctrine might be helpful in seeking to maintain an appropriate balance between the rights of 
states, and the rights of individuals. 
151 See the discussion of R v Hape [2007] SCC 26 in Ireland-Piper, supra note 48. 
152 R v Hape [2007] SCC 26.
153 Ibid.
154 P.-H. Verdier, ‘R v Hape 2007 SCC 26’, 2008 American Journal of International Law 102, no. 1, p. 143, p. 145.
155 R v Klassen [2008] BCSC 1762.
156 Ibid.
157 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (December 10, 1948), available online at <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/> (last visited 
13 September 2013).
158 Ibid., Art. 10. 
159 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly 
resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 49. 
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1. Abuse of rights  
In international law, the doctrine of abuse of rights prohibits states from making use of their rights 
if to do so impedes the enjoyment by other states of their own rights, or to achieve an end which is 
different from that for which the right was created, to the injury of another state.160 The abuse of rights of 
doctrine appears in arbitral,161 and judicial, decision making in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ),162 and in the appellate body of the World Trade 
Organisation.163 It also appears in treaties. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea requires Member States to ‘exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognised in this 
Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right’.164 
One of the obvious difficulties with the proposition that the abuse of rights doctrine may be helpful 
in regulating exercises of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction is that in international law the doctrine is 
generally understood in the context of rights between states, and not with rights as between an individual 
and a state. However, as Lauterpacht has advocated, ‘[t]here is no legal right, however well established, 
which could not, in some circumstances, be refused recognition on the ground that it has been abused’.165 
Further, international law extensively recognises the rights of individuals, as is evidenced by the existence 
of the ICCPR, the UDHR and other human rights treaties. It is not such a great leap to suggest that a state 
that exercises its jurisdictional rights over an individual in a manner inconsistent with the rule of law, 
abuses its rights. The abuse of rights doctrine can be understood as an ‘omnibus term to describe certain 
ways of exercising a power which are legally reprehensible’.166 
The abuse of rights doctrine may also be more willingly embraced by the domestic courts, rather 
than other principles of jurisdictional restraint that are predominately creatures of international law 
(such as the principle of non-interference). This is because there are principles and doctrines analogous 
to the international abuse of rights doctrine in the domestic law of many civil-law and common-law 
countries. Such principles may exist in a private law context such as in tort or property law, and others 
in a public law context, such as in administrative law. Either way, there are doctrines and principles 
prohibiting the exercise of rights by legal persons in a manner that is detrimental to the rights and 
interests of other legal persons.167
For example, a number of civil-law codes have provisions that prohibit the use of a right for a purpose 
other than for which it is intended. Article 226 of the German Civil Code prohibits the exercise of a right 
if the only purpose of such exercise is to cause damage to another.168 Other codes only recognise an abuse 
of a right where an element of intent is present. For example, Article 1912 of the Mexican Civil Code 
reads: ‘When damage is caused to another by the exercise of a right, there is only an obligation to make it 
good if it was proved that the right was exercised only to cause the damage.’ Similarly, Article 833 of the 
Italian Civil Code prohibits the exercise of a right if the purpose is to harm or inconvenience others.169 
Japan further requires an element of unreasonableness in order to establish an abuse of rights.170 
160 A. Kiss, ‘Abuse of Rights’, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 1, 1992, p. 4.
161 Byers, supra note 47, p. 400.
162 Ibid., p. 399.
163 Ibid., p. 401.
164 Art. 300 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, <http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/
texts/unclos/part16.htm> (last visited 13 September 2013). 
165 H. Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court, 1958, p. 164. 
166 G.D.S. Taylor, ‘The Content of the Rule Against Abuse of Rights in International Law’, 1972-1973 British Yearbook of International Law 46, 
p. 325. 
167 Byers, supra note 47, p. 392. 
168 Art. 266 of the German Civil Code, <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html> (last visited 13 September 
2013) (Civil Code in the version promulgated on 2 January 2002 (Federal Law Gazette [Bundesgesetzblatt] I, p. 42, 2909; 2003 I, p. 738), 
last amended by Art. 1 of the Statute of 27 July 2011 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 1600)).
169 Art. 833 of the Italian Civil Code (G. Alpa & V. Zeno-Zencovich, Italian Private Law, 2007, <http://shr.receptidocs.ru/docs/4/3577/conv_1/
file1.pdf> (last visited 13 September 2013)); see also Art. 1295(2) of the Austrian Civil Code (R. Schnopfhagen et al., Intellectual Property 
Law in Austria, 2011, p. 439). 
170 See, for example, the decision of the Japanese Supreme Court in Mitamura v Suzuki, 1067 Sup. Ct., 27 June 1972.
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It is true that the principle is less known in common-law systems, and, therefore more likely to meet 
with strong resistance from the common-law world. There are, however, analogous legal concepts. For 
example, it is suggested that the notion of abuse of rights is the basis on which tort law developed.171 
For example, the tort of ‘abuse of process’ in Australia has been described as ‘the clearest illustration in 
Australian law of what civil lawyers call an “abuse of right”’.172 The High Court of Australia has also drawn 
upon notions of ‘abuse of process’ in considering the propriety of a criminal prosecution.173 In the United 
Kingdom, the ‘abuse of discretion’ doctrine in English administrative law, and the notion of malicious 
prosecutions in criminal law are both somewhat analogous.174 Further, the concept of abuse of rights has 
been raised by a UK Judge in the context of piercing the corporate veil.175 Therefore, although it might be 
labelled differently, the basic principle underlying the abuse of rights doctrine does exist in the common 
law world. This paper adopts in generality the view expressed by Rick Bigwood in his discussion of abuse 
of rights in Anglo-Australian law:176 
‘I am untroubled by the particular label that one chooses to capture what seems to be a common 
idea in relation to a universal legal problem. What one prefers as “unconscionability”, another 
will favour as “abuse of rights” or “bad faith” (…) Acceptance of, or at least familiarity with, 
the idea behind the label is more important here than the label itself. Although it is true that 
no general “doctrine” of abuse of rights or good faith exists in Anglo-Australian law (…) there 
can be no denying that, in one guise or another, [such] notions (…) pervade discrete doctrines, 
rules and principles, and exceptions (…) throughout (…) common law and equity.’
Bigwood’s point is that while there may be no general ‘abuse of rights’ doctrine in common-law countries, 
the concept is inherent in a variety of common law and equitable principles. Similarly, although the 
doctrine varies throughout civil-law countries, one would not suggest that it does not exist in those 
jurisdictions. A variation in language or form is no argument against the existence of a substantive 
principle, that the right of one party should not be exercised to abuse the rights of the other. 
Therefore, the abuse of rights doctrine may provide a useful paradigm through which to regulate 
assertions of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. However, the Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
make no reference to abuse of rights, and some may be of the view that it is too imprecise to be of any 
use.177 For example, Schwarzenberger queries whether an abuse of rights can be distinguished from a 
harsh, but an otherwise justified exercise of rights.178 In response, this paper suggests that a ‘harsh but 
justified’ exercise of a jurisdictional right would be consistent with fair trial rights, whereas an abuse of 
right would not. Alternatively, it is suggested that a harsh but justified exercise of a jurisdictional right 
would be consistent with a substantive conception of the rule of law, whereas an abuse of right would not. 
This then begs the question: what is the content of the rule of law? 
A.V. Dicey is sometimes credited with introducing the term ‘rule of law’.179 However, the concept 
of the rule of law has a far longer history. Fred D. Miller describes a Greek document from the fifth 
century B.C., the Gortyn Law Code. At its outset, the Code stated: ‘If anyone wishes to contest the status 
of a free man or a slave, he is not to seize him before a trial.’180 Another author traced the idea back to 
Aristotle.181 Examples of adherence to, or aspiration towards, the rule of law can be found throughout the 
171 Byers, supra note 47, p. 396. 
172 J.G. Fleming, The Law of Torts, 1992, p. 623.
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175 Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited and others, [2013] UKSC 34, at [68(i)] per Lord Neuberger. 
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The University of Queensland Law Journal 27, no. 2, p. 41, p. 65.
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instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf> (last visited 13 September 2013).
178 G. Schwarzenberger & E.D. Brown, A Manual of International Law, 1976, p. 84. 
179 T. Bingham, The Rule of Law, 2010, p. 3. 
180 F.D. Miller, ‘The Rule of Law in Ancient Greek Thought’, in M. Sellers & T. Tomaszewski (eds.), The Rule of Law in Comparative Perspective, 
2010, pp. 11-18.
181 Bingham, supra note 179.
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world, and at various points in human history. Academics and philosophers have debated the concept 
for generations. Geoffrey Walker may be correct when he suggests the rule of law ‘is not easy to define 
with precision, because in part it manifests itself more as an absence than a presence.’182 Nonetheless, 
Fred Miller describes the rule of law as ‘a normative principle that political power may not be exercised 
except according to procedures and constraints prescribed by laws which are publicly known’.183 James 
Harrington writes of an ‘empire of laws and not of men’.184 And Friedrich Hayek offered what Brian 
Tamanaha describes as a ‘highly influential definition of the rule of law’.185 Hayek posits, 
‘Stripped of all technicalities, this means that government in all its action is bound by rules fixed 
and announced before-hand – rules which make it possible to forsee with fair certainty how the 
authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs 
on the basis of this knowledge.’186
Some may argue that the content of the rule of law is subject to cultural relativism. Mortimer Sellers 
concedes this point: ‘[t]he social, historical, geographical and other circumstances in different societies 
will always differ, limiting what is appropriate, prudent and possible in practice.’187 However, this paper 
adopts his view that ‘certain standards and basic institutions will be shared by every society that aspires 
to attain the government of laws and not of men’.188 As Brian Z. Tamanaha has observed, ‘support for the 
rule of law is not exclusive to the West’.189 In his view, 
‘The reasons they articulate for supporting the rule of law might differ, some in the interest of 
freedom, some in the preservation of order, many in the furtherance of economic development, 
but all identify it as essential.’190 
There is also some contest between neutral and substantive conceptions of the rule of law. A neutral 
conception may be seen simply as the requirement for all to follow the law, regardless of its content or 
morality. By contrast, a substantive conception has content, such as an inherent right to a fair trial, or 
to equality before the law. These are sometimes referred to as ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ conceptions. This paper 
advocates a ‘thick’ or ‘substantive’ conception of the rule of law. As George Fletcher states, ‘[w]hatever 
philosophers may argue, we know that the rule of law means more than the law of rules’.191
Further, the importance of the rule of law is widely recognised both in domestic and international 
frameworks. It is inherently linked with human rights. For example, the preamble to the UDHR describes 
it as essential that ‘human rights should be protected by the Rule of Law’.192 The European Convention 
on Human Rights speaks of a ‘common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule 
of law (…).’193 The American Convention on Human Rights does not specifically use the term ‘rule of 
law’, but Article 8 confers the right to a fair trial, and Article 9 provides protection against retrospective 
laws.194 Similarly, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights confers rights relating to fair trial,195 
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equality and equal protection before the law,196 and states ‘[n]o one may be deprived of his freedom 
except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law’.197 International organisations have also 
formally acknowledged the importance of the rule of law. For example, in 2005, the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) prepared an ‘Issues Brief ’ entitled Equal Access to 
Justice and the Rule of Law.198 Among other things, the brief asserts ‘[t]he rule of law and access to justice 
are crucial to the immediate upholding of law and order, and to human security imperatives, stability 
and development’.199 
While this paper does not seek to provide an exhaustive definition of the rule of law, if the concept 
is to be used as a benchmark by which to evaluate whether an assertion of extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction constitutes an abuse of rights, it is necessary to establish substantive content. Therefore, the 
rule of law is taken to refer to the following principles.
Principle 1: The law must be both readily known and available, and certain and clear
This principle requires legal certainty. James Maxeiner has described legal certainty as ‘a central tenet 
of the rule of law as understood around the world’. 200 Given the various bases on which extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction can be asserted, some prosecutions of extraterritorial criminal offences may 
undermine this principle. For example, if a national of State W interacts with a national of State X in the 
territory of State Y, in a manner that may affect the security interests of State Z, then States W, X, Y and 
Z all have a basis on which to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. Is it fair to assume that each national is 
familiar with the nationality of each person with whom they interact? And if so, is it also fair to assume 
each knows their legal obligations under the laws of that nation? As Tom Bingham has said, 
‘(…) if you and I are liable to be prosecuted, fined, and perhaps imprisoned for doing or failing 
to do something, we ought to be able, without undue difficulty, to find out what it is we must or 
must not do on pain of criminal penalty.’ 201
In reality, it is unreasonable to demand that every citizen of the world be familiar with the laws of each 
nation. Yet, the rule of law demands that the content of the law should be accessible to the public.202 It 
cannot be assumed that all laws of all nations are ‘knowable’. Therefore, if the laws of a state are to apply 
extraterritorially, then a precondition of prosecution for extraterritorial criminal offences must be that 
the law is ascertainable. In turn, this suggests that extraterritorial jurisdiction should only be asserted 
for widely recognised crimes, such as those forming the subject of international agreements and treaties.
 
Principle 2: The law should be applied to all people equally, and operate uniformly in circumstances which 
are not materially different
Article 7 of the UDHR provides that, ‘all are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to equal protection of the law.’203 As Walker has asserted, ‘the rule of law implies the 
precept that similar cases be treated similarly’.204 The problem with extraterritorial jurisdiction is that 
persons who have committed extraterritorial crimes may be treated differently than those who commit 
territorial crimes. For example, as noted above, in R v Hape205 and R v Klassen,206 the Supreme Court 
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of Canada held the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is limited to Canadian provinces and territories, 
and does not apply extraterritorially to searches and seizures outside of Canada. Further, as was also 
discussed above, a person accused of extraterritorial crimes do not enjoy the same level of protection 
against double jeopardy as a person accused of territorial crime. 
Principle 3: All people are entitled to a fair trial
The right to a fair trial is described as the ‘minimum content’ of the rule of law.207 Thom Brooks argues 
that it is the very importance of fairness to a trial that justifies the existence of a ‘right’ to a fair trial.208 
In his view, ‘[f]airness further entails that trial procedural rules apply to all parties equally without 
clear disadvantage to one over the other’.209 As noted above, persons accused of extraterritorial crime 
can be treated differently to those accused of territorial crime, and this diminishes their opportunity 
for a fair trial. For example, as discussed above in Ker v Illinois,210 the United States Supreme Court 
held that forcible abduction presents no valid objection to a criminal trial. Article 14(7) of the ICCPR 
provides: ‘No-one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already 
been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country.’211 
However, the Human Rights Committee has interpreted this principle to only apply to trials within a 
single jurisdiction, as opposed to trials in several different countries. 212 This means a person who is 
accused of committing a crime over which several states may have a jurisdictional claim is not protected 
from multiple prosecutions and may be brought to trial again and again, thereby increasing the chance 
of conviction. This raises questions as to whether persons accused of extraterritorial crimes are able to 
receive a fair trial. 
Principle 4: There must be some capacity for judicial review of administrative action and the executive arm 
of government should be subject to the law and any action undertaken by the executive should be authorised 
by law. 
It has been said that the ‘single greatest advance towards the rule of law occurs when judges secure 
their independence from executive and legislative power’.213 Regarding assertions of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, courts should play a role in considering whether prosecutions of extraterritorial conduct 
are consistent with the rule of law, or whether they are an abuse of process. Extradition arrangements and 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion are often matters for the executive, and states may try and hide 
behind the ‘act of state’ doctrine. However, courts should play a role in ensuring the act of state doctrine 
is not an impenetrable veil. For example, in Moti v The Queen,214 the High Court of Australia considered 
whether proceedings could be maintained against a person who had not properly been brought within 
the jurisdiction by regular means, or whether such proceedings were an abuse of process. In so doing, a 
majority of six to one concluded that the act of state doctrine does not preclude findings as to the legality 
of the conduct of a foreign government, where those conclusions are a necessary step in determining a 
question within the competency of the Court. 
It is suggested that these four principles together constitute a substantive conception of the rule of law. 
In turn, a substantive conception of the rule of law provides content to the abuse of rights doctrine. In 
summary, this paper suggests that if a state exercises extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in a manner 
that is inconsistent with the four principles set out above, it has abused its jurisdictional rights. 
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Conclusion
There are various bases on which a state may have a right to assert jurisdiction over conduct occurring 
extraterritorially. However, this right is not unyielding to the rights of individuals. Nonetheless, as this 
paper has shown, an exercise by a state of its jurisdictional rights may cause injustice to a person accused 
of an extraterritorial crime. In particular, the lack of a transnational principle of double jeopardy, the 
fact that states have better access to mutual legal assistance than individuals, and the ability of states to 
preclude constitutional guarantees from applying extraterritorially, are problematic. 
To that end, the abuse of rights doctrine may be a useful tool in regulating the relationship between a 
state’s jurisdictional rights, and the rights of individuals. In turn, the content of the abuse of rights doctrine 
can be found in a substantive conception of the rule of law. A substantive conception of the rule of law 
consists of certainty, equality, fair trial rights, and judicial review of administrative and executive action. 
Petty arguments over the label of a particular legal doctrine are not enough to mask the existence of a 
legal principle which provides that one party’s rights are not absolute in relation to the rights of another. 
This is particularly important when considering the relationship between the rights of an individual and 
the rights of states in criminal law. The ways in which criminal justice is administrated goes to the core of 
the legitimacy of the relationship between the state and an individual. Indeed, the ‘field of battle in which 
democracy and human rights are tested is the administration of criminal justice, which encompasses 
all processes and practices by which a state effects, curtails, or removes basic rights’.215 Therefore, a state 
that asserts extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in such a way as to deprive an individual of legal certainty, 
equality before the law, fair trial rights, or so as to preclude judicial review, is a state that abuses its rights. ¶
215 Bassiouni, supra note 136, p. 236.
